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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RESOLUTION
OF THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT
Kofi Oteng Kufuor
INTRODUCTION
On March 7, 1994, a transitional government was sworn in to admin-
ister war-torn Liberia.' The Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS or Community),2 the main warring factions, and the
United Nations formed this new government after repeated efforts to
effect a lasting solution to the conflict that began in December 1989.?
This Article reviews the peace process and explores the question of why
five years of negotiations have still not managed to bring about lasting
peace in Liberia.
Throughout the negotiations, the ECOWAS placed most of the blame
for its inability to end the war on the main rebel army, the National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). These allegations were valid to the
* LL.M., London School of Economics and Political Science; B.A. (Hans.),
University of Science and Technology, Ghana. This Article represents research caried
out when I was a Visiting Scholar at the Research Centre for International Law at
Cambridge University. I would like to thank the following people who, in diverse
ways, made research for this Article possible: Professor Rosalyn Higgins, Professor Eli
Lauterpacht, Professor James Crawford, Mark WelIer, Baffour Ankomah, and
Alexandra Macleod. All opinions expressed herein, however, are mine.
1. See New Ruling Council Takes Over, W. AFR., Mar. 14-20, 1994, at 463
(describing how the interim President of Liberia resigned and a five-member Liberian
National Transitional Government replaced him).
2. See S.K.B. AsANTE, THE PoLrrlCAL ECONOMY OF REcIONALISM tN AFRICA:
A DECADE OF THE ECONOMIC COMMWUnrY oF WEsT AFRICAN STA7FS (ECOWAS)
1200 (1986) (describing how the ECOWAS is made up of the following members:
Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Dahomey (now Benin), Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo,
and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso)). The ECOWAS was established in 1975 for the
purpose of closer economic cooperation among the states in the West African sub-
region. Id.
3. See Invasion by Dissidents, W. AFPR., Jan. 8-14, 1990, at 33-34 (discussing
the beginning of the conflict in Liberia).
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extent that the NPFL repeatedly refused to disarm and encamp its fight-
ers. The NPFL's refusal prevented the ECOWAS from deploying its
peace-keeping force in parts of Liberia.4 The underlying problem for the
impasse, however, was not rooted in any inordinate ambition of the
NPFL to forcibly usurp power, but rather was a result of the origins and
institutional framework of the main peace accords.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT
AND THE ECOWAS INTERVENTION
The Liberian conflict began in December 1989, when the NPFL re-
belled against President Samuel Doe with the purpose of overthrowing
his government.' The rebels succeeded in reaching the capital,
Monrovia, and besieged the presidential residence where the President,
the rump of his administration, and the remnants of the Armed Forces
of Liberia (AFL) had sought refuge.' In an attempt to peacefully re-
solve the conflict, the ECOWAS decided to intervene in the conflict in
August 1990, over the opposition of the NPFL, by sending a peace-
keeping force to Liberia
Five years after the insurgency began and four years after the
ECOWAS intervention, Liberia remains a country in turmoil as of the
signing of the most recent peace accord. The NPFL led by Charles
Taylor occupies about half of Liberia, while the ECOWAS Cease-Fire
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) controls the capital and its outskirts. In
addition, proliferation of guerrilla armies in Liberia since 1991 has com-
plicated the peace process. The guerilla armies include the United Liber-
ation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO),8 which controls
the counties on the border with Sierra Leone; the Nimba Redemption
Council, which has done little since its initial attacks on the NPFL
4. See Mediation Committee Meets (Banjul), AFR. RES. BuLL., Aug. 1-31, 1990,
at 9802 (reporting on the reaction of the NPFL to the introduction of the ECOWAS
peace-keeping troops in Liberia).
5. See Invasion by Dissidents, supra note 3, at 33 (describing how the rebellion
began when the dissidents entered Liberia on December 24, 1989).
6. See Doe Clings On, AFR. REs. BULL., July 1-31, 1990, at 9772 (detailing the
street-to-street battle that took place between the rebel forces and President Doe's
forces).
7. See Mediation Committee Meets (Banjul), supra note 4, at 9801 (reporting
that the peace-keeping force consisted of soldiers from Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo,
Mali, Sierra Leone, and Guinea).
8. See New Group Issues Ultimatum, AFR. RES. BULL., June 1-30, 1990, at
10,176 (describing the formation of the ULIMO and outlining its objectives).
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military positions;9 the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), which is fighting
the NPFL.in the southeastern part of Liberia; and the Lofa Defense
Force, which is fighting the ULIMO in Lofa County."
II. THE INITIAL EFFORTS AT RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
As the fighting between the NPFL and the AFL intensified in 1990,
the Community, relying on Article 5 of the ECOWAS treaty, which sets
out the framework and powers of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of
State and Government (AHSG)," and on the ECOWAS Protocol on
Non-Aggression,'" established a Standing Mediation Committee
(SMC).' 4 The SMC comprises four members appointed by the AHSG
and the Chairman of the AHSG, who will also act as Chairman of the
SMC.5 The SMC's framework for dispute resolution, paradoxically,
does not apply to internal conflicts, but rather to inter-state disputes in
the sub-region. 6
9. Liberia: NPFL Radio Says Cote D'Ivoire to Retaliate After ECOMOG Raid,
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Mar. 5, 1993, at B/10 (reporting that the Nimba
Redemption Council began to attack the NPFL in February 1993. after it had crossed
over the border into Liberia from neighboring Guinea).
10. See Political Wrangling, AFa. RES. BULL, Nov. 1-30, 1993, at 11,239-40
(discussing the fighting between the NPFL and the LPC in eastern coastal Liberia);
see also Official Says Reconstruction Programme Has Been Dravn Up, SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 7, 1993, at A/13 (naming the members of the LPC).
11. See Fierce Fighting Reported Between UIMO and LDF in Lofa. St?,,thARY
OF WORLD BROADCASTs, Dec. 17, 1993, at A15 (describing the fighting between the
Lofa Defense Force and the ULIMO following allegations that the ULIMO committed
atrocities against non-Mandingo citizens in Lofa County, Liberia).
12. Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, May 28, 1975,
art. 5, reprinted in ASANTE, supra note 2, at 1200. The AHSG is the principal gov-
erning institution of the Community. It is responsible for and has general direction
and control of the performance of the executive functions of the Community. Id.
13. Protocol on Non-Aggression, Apr. 22, 1978, reprinted in ECONOMIC Co.sfu-
NITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES: POLICIES AND PROGRAMME SERiES 21-22 (1981).
14. Decision A/DEC.9/5/90 Relating to the Establishment of the Standing Media-
tion Committee, ECOWAS AHSG, 21 O-1. ECOWAS SPEC. SUPP. 5 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Decision A/DEC.9/5/90].
15. Id. art. 1(2). The then-SMC comprised of members from Gambia as chair-
man, Ghana, Togo, Mali and Nigeria. ECOWAS Mediation, AFRL RES. BULL, July, 1-
31, 1990, at 9772.
16. See Decision A/DEC.9/5/90, supra note 14, arts. 2-3 (providing the mecha-
nism for resolving conflicts between member-states). The framework provides a system
in which a member-state involved in a dispute or conflict could inform the Executive
Secretary of the ECOWAS in writing of its intention to refer the matter to the SMC
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The escalation of fighting in Liberia, however, forced the ECOWAS
to reevaluate the appropriateness of the SMC in resolving this conflict.
At its thirteenth session, the Community concluded that the SMC pro-
vided an appropriate mechanism for settling the dispute." Accordingly,
the ECOWAS decreed that the warring factions cease all military or
para-military activities," surrender their arms and ammunition to the
ECOMOG, 9 and refrain from importing and acquiring weapons or war
materials.' The warring factions also have to refrain from activity that
would impede the establishment of an interim government or the holding
of general and presidential elections,2 ' and fully cooperate with the
SMC, the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, and the ECOMOG so that a
cease-fire can be maintained, and law and order be restored to Libe-
ria.2" The ECOWAS also assigned the ECOMOG the function of assist-
ing the SMC in supervising the implementation and strict compliance by
the parties of a cease-fire.'
This peace plan, however, was bound to fail from its inception be-
cause it did not take into account the real situation on the ground in
Liberia. At that time, the NPFL controlled all of Liberia except the
presidential residence and its immediate vicinity. Meanwhile, the
ECOWAS had not yet established a military presence in Liberia. Thus,
there was no incentive or pressure on the NPFL to abandon its insur-
gency and surrender to what was in effect a non-existent expeditionary
force.
for settlement. Id. art. 2. The Executive Secretary then advises the Chairman of the
AHSG and the governments of the other members of the SMC about the dispute, and
takes measures to help the SMC in settling the conflict. Id. art. 3(1). The framework
requires the AHSG Chairman to inform the member-states involved in the conflict of
the intention of the SMC to mediate their dispute. Id. The AHSG Chairman must
also report to the AHSG about the nature of the dispute, the parties involved, and the
SMC's mediation efforts. Id. art. 4.
17. Decision A/DEC.1/8/90 on the Cease-fire and Establishment of an ECOWAS
Cease-fire Monitoring Group for Liberia, ECOWAS SMC, 21 O.J. ECOWAS SPEC.
SuPp. 6 (1992).
18. Id. art. l(2)(a).
19. Id. art. 1(2)(b).
20. Id. art. 1(2)(c).
21. Id. art. l(2)(d).
22. Id. art. 1(2)(g).
23. Id. art. 2(3).
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I. THE CREATION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
As part of the peace process, the ECOWAS moved to expedite the
creation of an interim government for Liberia.' This interim govern-
ment would administer the country and organize free and fair elections
to usher in a democratically elected government' The SMC convened
a conference of all political parties and interest groups for the purpose
of establishing a broad-based interim government.'
A communique of the National Conference of All Liberian Political
Parties, Patriotic Fronts, Interest Groups and Concerned Citizens,' how-
ever, stated that all efforts by the Liberian Inter-Faith Mediation Com-
mittee and the SMC to end the hostilities and achieve a peaceful resolu-
tion of the conflict had proven futile because of the warring parties'
inability to reach a consensus on the framework of a peace plan. : Ac-
cordingly, no government presently exists in Liberia. The warring fac-
tions have effectively apportioned the country and are holding the entire
population hostage, depriving the people of food, shelter, health care,
and other basic human needs.'
As a result, the Conference declared that the Interim Government of
National Unity (IGNU) should be established.' In establishing the
IGNU, the Conference relied on the inherent sovereign right of the
Liberian people to make laws consistent with the spirit and intent of the
Constitution of Liberia.3' The delegates of the Conference, thus, drafted
a framework for the establishment of the IGNU.' First, the Confer-
24. Decision A/DEC.2/8/90 of the Community Standing Mediation Committee on
the Constitution of an Interim Government in the Republic of Liberia, 21 OJ.
ECOWAS SpEc. SuPp. 8 (1992).
25. ld. pmbl., art. 1(2).
26. Id. art. I(I).
27. Final Communique of the National Conference of All Liberian Political Par-
ties, Patriotic Fronts, Interest Groups and Concerned Citizens Banjul. the Gambia,
Aug. 27 - Sept. 1, 1990, 21 OJ. ECOWAS SPEC. SUP?. 29 (1992).
28. Id. 7.
29. Id. 8.
30. Id. 13(a).
31. Id. 13.
32. See Peter da Costa, Interim Leaders Emerge, W. AFR., Sept. 10-16, 1990. at
2438 (reporting the election of an interim government in Liberia). The main functions
of the Interim Government are as follows:
(a) the adoption, with the support of ECOMOG, of measures to demilitarize the
combatants and create an apparatus for the maintenance of law and order;,
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ence, upon the joint nomination by the political parties and interest
groups, endorsed Dr. Amos Sawyer as the President of the IGNU and
elected Dr. Peter Naigow from the Independent National Patriotic Front
of Liberia (INPFL)33 as the Vice-President.4 Second, the Conference
established a legislature comprised of twenty-six members from the
thirteen counties of Liberia; thirteen from the Assembly in Gbarnga;
thirteen from the Assembly in Monrovia;35 twelve from the six existing
political parties, two each;36 six from the NPFL; five from the
INPFL;37 and two from interest groups not serving on the Interim Elec-
toral Commission for a total of fifty-one members.38
Even though the NPFL opposed the idea of establishing an interim
government, the IGNU framework included the NPFL in the government
of post-war Liberia. Six members of the legislature were going to be
direct representatives of the NPFL and another thirteen were going to be
elected from the Assembly at Gbarnga, a Taylor stronghold. The NPFL
could gain even more influence in the interim legislature because, at that
time, the NPFL controlled ten of Liberia's thirteen counties from which
representatives were going to be elected.39
(b) the facilitation of the repatriation and resettlement of refugees, displaced
persons and exiled Liberians;
(c) the initiation of a process of national reconciliation and unity;
(d) the creation of the necessary conditions, including the establishment of an
independent and acceptable electoral commission for the organization and super-
vision of general and presidential elections which should be held no later than
the constitutionally prescribed date in 1991;
(e) the establishment of a National Commission on Resettlement, Rehabilitation
and Reconstruction with a mandate to facilitate a normal life for the displaced
population; [and]
(f) the establishment of the requisite bodies, boards and/or commissions that
would enable the people of Liberia to effectively participate in the affairs of
their Government by deliberation on normal issues and closely monitoring the
activities of Government to ensure efficiency, economy and accountability.
Final Communique, supra note 27, 15.
33. The INPFL was a breakaway, and now defunct, splinter group of the NPFL.
34. Final Communique, supra note 27, at 34.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The Final Communique announced that the Interim Legislative Assembly
would consist of 35 instead of 51 members. Id. at 31. Of the 35 members retaining
their seats, six would come from the NPFL, four from the INPFL, one from each of
the 13 counties in Liberia, and two from each of Liberia's six political parties. Id.
39. Id. at 31.
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Nevertheless, the NPFL remained distrustful of the ECOMOG and of
the IGNU because several of the NPFL's concerns were left unan-
swered. For example, what would happen if the NPFL fighters disarmed
and encamped, and the President, in control of the army and police, de-
cided to suspend the Constitution and rule by decree? Who would then
have the power to effectively challenge the President's power? In the
event of a dispute between the executive (i.e., the ECOWAS-backed
interim government) and legislative branches (presumably controlled by
the NPFL), would the ECOWAS and ECOMOG remain neutral or
would they support the interim administration which was their virtual
ally? Conceivably, the exclusion of the NPFL from the executive branch
of the IGNU deterred it from participating in the administration of Libe-
ria, thereby continuing the deadlock.
In 1991, the Community organized another round of talks between the
IGNU and the NPFL to end the conflict. These new talks attempted to
foster a relationship of trust between the two parties. Therefore, this
meeting not only involved the NPFL and neutral observers from the
International Negotiations Network (INN), but also included member-
states of the Community that were sympathetic to the NPFL's cause.
The Community believed that by involving neutral parties in the negoti-
ations, it could win Taylor's confidence and lay a solid foundation for
reconciliation between the warring factions."
40. See id. at 34 (presenting the NPFL's proposals for an interim government
and its reasons for walking out of the negotiations). The NPFL submitted its own
proposal for the framework of an interim government. The NPFL-proposed interim
government would comprise a triumvirate of co-equals, called the Council of National
Unity, who would run the executive arm; and a legislature consisting of 26 members,
two members representing each of the 13 counties. The NPFL walked out of the
Conference claiming that its proposals had not received adequate consideration. Id.
41. See Outcome of Deliberations of the Meeting in Yamoussoukro on 29 and 30
June 1991, 21 OJ. ECOWAS SPEC. SUPP. 22 (1992) (stating that the ECOVAS
sought the aid of President Felix Houphouet-Boigny and of the INN). This meeting
was the first of the four meetings held at Yamoussoukro on the Liberian crisis and
should be regarded as Yamoussoukro I. Final Communique of the First Meeting of
the Committee of Five on Liberia, Yamoussoukro, 29 July 1991, 21 OJ. ECOWAS
SPEc. Supp. 23 (1992). The Yamoussoukro Accords, collectively, were not the only
peace initiatives designed to end the war. They, however, represented the major at-
tempts at settling the conflict, which culminated in the Yamoussoukro IV Accord.
Other efforts at resolving the conflict included the Joint Declaration on Cessation of
Hostilities and Peaceful Settlement of Conflict, 21 OJ. ECOWAS SPEC. SUPp. 14
(1992); Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities and Peaceful Settlement of Conflict, 21
OJ. ECOWAS SPEC. SUPP. 16 (1992); Joint Declaration on the Liberian Situation, 21
OJ. ECOWAS SPEC. SUPP. 22 (1992); and Final Communique of the Informal Con-
1994]
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Despite the Community's bona fide effort to expedite the peace pro-
cess, the NPFL still refused to comply with the encampment and dis-
armament provisions of the peace plan.42 The NPFL opposed the peace
plan because troops from the original member-states who had repeatedly
clashed with the NPFL, made up the ECOMOG. Therefore, while the
necessary diplomatic initiatives were successful, the Community failed to
assess realistically the situation and, consequently, did not include sol-
diers from member-states who the NPFL could trust in the ECOMOG.
Because of the continued deadlock, the Community convened another
round of talks. The Committee of Five on the Liberian Crisis held its
second meeting in Yamoussoukro, Cote d'Ivoire.43 At this meeting, the
Committee took a more positive approach aimed at winning the confi-
dence of the NPFL. It also recognized the importance of establishing
peace and security on the ground. By securing peace, the Community
could achieve its goals of gaining the confidence of the warring parties
and holding free and fair elections in Liberia." The Committee accord-
ingly agreed to remodel and reinforce the ECOMOG.45
In addition to the Committee's efforts, the IGNU sought to involve
the NPFL in the electoral process. As part of the accord from this meet-
ing, the IGNU and the NPFL agreed to set up a five-member Elections
Commission for the organization and supervision of elections46 and to
establish a five-member Ad Hoc Supreme Court to adjudicate disputes
arising out of the electoral process.47
At the second meeting, the Committee also decided to hold a third
meeting on the crisis in October 1991. At the third meeting, which
produced the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, the Community was optimistic
that the second meeting had formed a stable basis for the final resolu-
tion of the conflict.48 The Committee issued a communique at the end
sultative group Meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Liberia, Genera, 6-7
April 1992, 21 O.J. ECOWAS SPEC. SuPP. 48 (1992).
42. Technically, the NPFL was no longer required to disarm completely. The
Community found it necessary to rely on the NPFL to maintain security in parts of
Liberia until the conclusion of the elections.
43. Final Communique of the Second Meeting of Five on the Liberian Crisis in
Yamoussoukro, 16-17 September 1991, 21 O.J. ECOWAS 24 (1992). This Committee
of Five consisted of members from Gambia, Togo, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, and Cote
d'Ivoire. Id.
44. Id. 5.
45. Id.
46. Id. 8.
47. Id. 9.
48. See Final Communique of the Third Meeting on the Liberian Crisis Held in
[VOL. 10O: 1380
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of this meeting acknowledging that the IGNU and the NPFL, in conso-
nance with the agreement reached in the last meeting, had nominated a
five-member Ad-Hoc Supreme Court to adjudicate disputes that may
arise from the electoral process.49 The Committee also urged the two
parties to take all the necessary steps to ensure that the. Interim Elec-
tions Commission could begin its work immediately."
With regard to disarmament and encampment, the Committee consid-
ered and agreed on a plan to implement the elements of a cease-fire.
The plan envisaged peace and security on the ground within sixty days
of its implementation and elections in Liberia with six months from the
date of the third meeting.5'
The NPFL, however, continued to refuse to abide by the terms of the
Yamoussoukro IV Accord because of three major concerns: (1) the
creation of the ULIMO; (2) the ULIMO's attacks on the NPFL posi-
tions; and (3) the continuing mistrust of the ECOMOG. The NPFL
amplified its concerns through a letter from former U.S. President Jim-
my Carter to the Heads of State of the Community.' President Carter
conveyed the NPFL's fears that the ECOMOG had not done enough to
prevent the ULIMO from arming and entering Liberia or had actually
encouraged the ULIMO to do so.' The NPFL also had considerable
apprehension about the true motives of the ECOMOG. In the letter, the
former U.S. President stated that the NPFL leaders want peace, stability,
and free elections in Liberia, but feared that they and their forces would
be destroyed if they abandon their defenses.' Taylor and his command-
ers emphasized that the size and strength of the ECOMOG contingent
positioned in Monrovia and Sierra Leone appeared more like an offen-
Yamoussoukro, 29-30 October 1991, 21 OJ. ECOWAS SPEC. SuPP. 26 (1992) (citing
developments since the Committee's last meeting).
49. ld. 4.
50. Id.
51. l 6.
52. Letter of Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to ECOWAS Heads of State
(Sept. 14, 1992), reprinted in 17 LmIE. STUD. J. 262 (1992).
53. ld.; see Liberia: NPFL Denies holding Senegalese Troops; Alleges ECOMOG
is Helping ULIMO, SUMIMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, June 8, 1992, at B/10 (re-
porting that the NPFL accused the ECOMOG of aiding the ULIMO to gain territory
in Liberia). Even though it has a common enemy, the NPFL, the ULIMO has not al-
ways had a good working relationship with the Interim Government. See Liberia:
ULIMO Congress Postponed, Leadership Crisis Reported, SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, May 20, 1993, at B/8 (noting a disagreement between the IGNU and
the ULIMO).
54. Letter of Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, supra note 52, at 263.
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sive force rather than a peacekeeper.55 The Carter letter also stressed
the NPFL's fear that its officers may be annihilated unless there is some
trustworthy restraint on the ECOMOG. Lastly, the letter identified a
related problem in that there is no dependable means of communication
between the NPFL and the outside world, which can lead to isolation
and distrust.56
IV. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
IN THE PEACE PROCESS
In October 1992, the NPFL launched an assault on Monrovia aimed
at dislodging the ECOMOG and seizing power. The ECOMOG, howev-
er, was able to repel the attack. In response to this latest offensive, the
United Nations decided to get involved in the peace process by adopting
Resolution 788.5' Resolution 788 reflected the U.N. Security Council's
belief that the Yamoussoukro IV Accord represented the best possible
framework for a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict." The Res-
olution called for an immediate arms embargo against Liberia,59 except
for weapons and military equipment destined for the sole use of the
ECOWAS peacekeeping force.'
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. S.C. Res. 788, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. S\Res\788 (1992).
This Resolution represents the first positive step taken by the U.N. to break the im-
passe. Ever since it first intervened in Liberia, however, the ECOWAS has tried to
bring its role to the attention of the Security Council. The Community described its
intervention to the U.N. as a response to the cries of women and children in the
Liberian conflict. Taylor Rejects Bamako Initiative, W. AFR., Nov. 12-18, 1990, at
2836. The intervention involved authorizing and supporting the operations of the
ECOMOG. The ECOMOG had a mandate not to take sides, but to reconcile the war-
ring parties, restore peace, and create an atmosphere for free political activity and,
eventually, democratic elections. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 2974 mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc.
S\PV.2974 (1991). The Security Council subsequently endorsed the ECOWAS peace
initiative. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. S\22133 (1991).
Humanitarian concerns were not the only reasons for the Community's decision
to intervene in the conflict. Some Community leaders believed that such conflicts
could fall on or spread to their countries. Fresh Impetus for Peace?, W. AFR., Nov.
16-22, 1992, at 1968; Taylor Rejects Bamako Initiative, W. AFR., Nov. 12-18, 1990,
at 2836.
58. S.C. Res. 788, supra note 57, 2.
59. Id. 8.
60. Id. 9.
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By adopting the Resolution, the U.N. Security Council indicated that
it did not have a full and proper understanding of the nature of the
conflict. Apart from placing an arms embargo on the NPFL, the Resolu-
tion provided no new initiatives for breaking the political impasse. The
Security Council believed that the Yamoussoukro IV Accord was still
the best solution under the circumstances even though the NPFL and the
ECOMOG never fully implemented the Accord. The Security Council
needed to assess carefully the positions of all the parties, including the
ECOWAS, before it adopted a resolution to bring about lasting peace in
Liberia.
Resolution 788, however, contained one positive provision. It required
the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Security Council on the
implementation of the Resolution."' The Secretary-General's Report,
based on an appraisal of the conflict by his Special Representative,"
identified the main obstacles to a lasting solution as well as the role the
U.N. should play in Liberia. The Report highlighted the views of some
of the ECOWAS Heads of State. President Soglo of Benin, for instance,
impressed upon the Special Representative that the U.N has a clear role
in monitoring a cease-fire, encampment and disarmament, demobiliza-
tion, and the organization of free and fair elections. Because of the level
of mistrust among the various protagonists, President Soglo felt that a
greater U.N. involvement would ensure successful implementation of the
Yanoussoukro IV Accord.' The Report also stated that Charles
Taylor, the NPFL leader, supported greater U.N. involvement as the
NPFL was skeptical of the ECOWAS' and also lacked confidence in
the effectiveness of the ECOMOG.6
Based on the views of the warring parties, the Report concluded that
the deployment of United Nations observersf was necessary to halt the
61. Id. 13.
62. Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Liberia, U.N. SCOR. 47th
Sess., U.N. Doc. S\25402 (1993).
63. Id. 23.
64. Id. 28 (commenting that the NPFL was amenable to a cease-fire and dis-
cussions leading to free and fair elections if the United Nations were fully involved
in the process).
65. See id. (noting that the ECOWAS involvement in the creation of the interim
government in Banjul in 1990 resulted in a circumvention of the country's existing
constitution).
66. See id. (recognizing that the dominance of Nigeria in the ECOMOG lessened
its neutral peace-keeping abilities and created a real threat to the personal safety of
the NPFL leader, Mr. Taylor).
67. Id. 30 (suggesting that 200 United Nations observers work alongside the
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armed conflict and to reach a cease-fire agreement.' The Report sug-
gested that broadening the number of countries participating in the
ECOMOG peacekeeping force would alleviate the distrust of the
NPFL.'9 The Report also observed that the United Nations Charter sup-
ported its continued involvement in the conflict. Throughout the conflict,
the ECOWAS undertook diplomatic initiatives0 that the U.N. Security
Council supported.7' The cooperation of the United Nations and the
ECOWAS is consistent with Chapter VIII of the United Nations
Charter." Hence, the Secretary-General stated that the cooperation and
expanded involvement of U.N. observers in Liberia served the best
interests of all parties involved, including the U.N. Security Council.
The Security Council adopted Resolution 813"' after considering the
Secretary-General's Report. Resolution 813 is an attempt by the Security
Council to reaffirm its commitment to support the ECOWAS efforts to
restore peace in Liberia while also accommodating the concerns of the
NPFL. The Resolution reiterated the role of the ECOWAS, which is to
facilitate rather than impose peace in Liberia.74 The Resolution also
embodied the United Nation's favorable response to the warring parties'
suggestion that it should play a greater role in the peace process.75 Fi-
nally, the Resolution suggested that the Secretary-General assemble the
ECOMOG forces at ports and border crossings).
68. See id. (recognizing that the presence of neutral United Nations observers
could provide the "link" that brings the hesitant factions together peacefully).
69. Id. 32.
70. Id. 40 (recognizing that the ECOWAS was instrumental in the development
and implementation of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord).
71. See id. (noting that the President of the Security Council was supportive of
the efforts by the ECOWAS, which prompted the Security Council to adopt Resolu-
tion 788); see also U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. S\22133 (1991) (endors-
ing the ECOWAS peace initiative).
72. See U.N. CHARTER art. 52(3) (encouraging the Security Council and regional
organizations to work together to reach settlements of local disputes); see also Report
of the Secretary-General on the Question of Liberia, supra note 62, 10 (showing
the collaborative efforts of the United Nations and NGOs in coordinating aid for
food, water, sanitation, disease control, and nutritional surveillance).
73. S.C. Res. 813, U.N. SCOR, 3187th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/Res/813 (1993).
74. See id. 4 (noting that under the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, the ECOWAS
would assist in implementing the provisions of the Accord and allow for free and fair
elections in Liberia).
75. See id. 11 (declaring the Security Council's readiness to enforce the en-
campment and disarmament provisions of the Yamoussoukro Accords when appropri-
ate).
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warring factions to "restate their commitment to the implementation of
the Yamoussoukro IV Accord within an agreed timetable."76
V. THE COTONOU PEACE ACCORD
The IGNU, the NPFL, and the ULIMO signed the Cotonou Peace
Accord.' The Accord embodied the results of the preliminary negotia-
tions at the Geneva Conference, which the three parties attended. One of
the most important issues discussed at Geneva was the composition of
the executive arm of a new transitional government to be installed as a
successor to the IGNU. The IGNU representative proposed that the
transitional government's Executive Branch be composed of a President
and two Vice-Presidents. The IGNU would name the President while the
NPFL and the ULIMO would each select a Vice-President. The NPFL,
however, proposed that the parties should form a five-member Council
of State. The parties would each select a member of the Council. The
two remaining members would be selected from a list of nine nominees
through a process of consultation. The Council would have a rotating
chairmanship. Each member selected by the three parties would hold the
position for two months."8
The Cotonou Accord, signed July 25, 1993, was expected to be the
final peace agreement. It marked a substantial departure from the
Yamoussoukro IV Accord. Under this agreement, the ECOMOG and the
U.N. Observer Mission would share responsibility for implementing the
peace accord. This arrangement represents a significant change over the
Yamoussoukro IV Accord, which gave the ECOWAS sole responsibility
for such tasks:' The ECOMOG would also contain troops from outside
the West African sub-region.' Finally, the parties agreed to establish a
Joint Cease-Fire Monitoring Committee with the authority to monitor
and investigate all reports of cease-fire violations until the arrival of the
ECOMOG and a full contingent of the United Nations Observer Mis-
76. Id. 17.
77. See Cotonou Accord, July 25, 1993, reprinted in REGIONAL PEAcE-KEEING
AND INTERNATIONAL EFORCEMENr LBER AN Clusis 343, 352 (Marc Weller ed.,
1994) (indicating that the IGNU, NPFL, and ULIMO were all signatories to the
Cotonou Agreement).
78. Liberia: Agreement Reported at Geneva Talks, But Some Issues Still Unre-
solved, SUMiARY OF WoRLD BROADCASTS, July 19, 1993, at ii.
79. See Cotonou Accord, supra note 77, art. 3(1) (recognizing the equal authority
of the United Nations observers in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement).
80. Id. art. 3(2).
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sion.8 ' This Joint Committee would be made up of an equal number of
representatives from the three parties, the ECOMOG, and an advance
team of the United Nations Observer Mission. The Committee would
divide into smaller groups, chaired by a United Nations observer, and
monitor particular geographic areas.
The Cotonou Accord also dilutes the absolute supervisory role of the
ECOMOG in the implementation of the peace process. Although the
parties were to disarm the ECOMOG in its expanded form, the United
Nations Observer Mission would monitor and verify the process." This
condition was not part of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. In addition, the
U.N. Observer Mission would monitor and verify the encampment of the
troops of the warring parties as well as the identification and security of
the encampment sites.83
Under the Cotonou Accord, the parties agreed to vest the executive
powers of Liberia in a five-member Council of State during the tran-
sitional period. Each of three parties would appoint one member to the
Council, and a panel of three eminent Liberians who the parties nomi-
nate would select the remaining two." The Council would then select a
Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen from its members." The position of
Chairman would not rotate the way the NPFL suggested. The members,
instead, would be equal because the Council would make all decisions
by consensus.86 These provisions signified the incorporation of the
NPFL into the government of Liberia and an acceptance, to a consider-
able extent, of the proposals the NPFL submitted at the Liberian Na-
tional Conference in 1990,' and at the Geneva peace talks in 1993.88
The Security Council responded to these developments by adopting
Resolution 856.89 In the Resolution, the Security Council noted the im-
portance of the Cotonou Accord in contributing to the end of the Libe-
81. Id. art. 3(3).
82. Id. art. 6(l)-(7).
83. Id. art. 7(1)-(3).
84. Id. art. 14(7)(i). The remaining positions in the cabinet would be filled by
consultation among the parties. Id. art. 14(7)(viii).
85. Id. art. 14(7)(v);
86. Id. art. 14(7)(vi).
87. See Final Communique, supra note 27, at 34 (noting that the NPFL's core
proposal for the Executive arm of the government was a Council of National Unity
consisting of three co-equal heads-of-state).
88. Liberia: Agreement Reported at Geneva Talks, But Some Issues Still Unre-
solved, SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, July 19, 1993, at ii.
89. S.C. Res. 856, U.N. SCOR, 3263d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/856 (1993).
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rian conflict and restoring peace to this region of West Africa.' The
Security Council also approved the immediate participation of an ad-
vance team of United Nation military observers to work with the Joint
Cease-fire Monitoring Committee in monitoring the Cotonou Accord's
cease-fire agreement.9
The Security Council, after considering the Report of the Secretary-
General on the proposed establishment of the United Nations Observer
Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL),1 adopted Resolution 866.0 The Reso-
lution provided a framework for the U.N. Observer Mission. The
UNOMIL would monitor compliance with the Cotonou Accord's cease-
fire agreement and oversee the implementation of the Accord's other
provisions.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Resolution 866, the Secretary-General
reported to the Security Council on the UNOMIL's efforts to end the
conflict.' The Secretary-General's first report noted that despite the
delays in implementing the Cotonou Accord, there were no major viola-
tions of the crease-fire.' The report also stated that progress was being
made in disarmament and in the installation of the transitional govern-
ment. The Secretary-General, however, doubted that the original timeta-
ble for elections could be met.98
The Secretary-General's second report highlighted two obstacles
that continue to hinder the peace process. First, the parties disagreed
over when the actual disarmament process should begin." The parties
90. Ld. pmbl.
91. Id. 2.
92. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Liberia, supra note
62, H 10-31 (recommending the structure of the U.N. Observer Mission and its oper-
ations under the Cotonou Agreement).
93. S.C. Res. 866, U.N. SCOR, 3281st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res!866 (1993).
94. Id. I 3(a).
95. Id. I 3(b).
96. See 1i. 2 (conditioning the UNOMIL's presence in Liberia upon the Secre-
tary-General's report that progress towards lasting peace is being made).
97. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in
Liberia, U.N. SCOR, 32, U.N. Doec. S/26868 (1993).
98. I. 34.
99. Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Ob-
server Mission in Liberia, U.N. SCOR. U.N. Doec. S119941168 (1994).
100. See id. 5 (reporting that the NPFL and the ULIMO would disarm if the
installation of the Transitional Government coincides with the arrival of additional
ECOMOG troops). The IGNU, however, wanted the installation of the Transitional
Government to take place after the actual commencemen. of disarmament. Id.
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eventually resolved this difference by making concessions."' Second, a
number of armed groups in Liberia emerged, each with its own agenda.
The activities of the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), the Lofa Defence
Force (LDF), and the Bong Resistance Movement (BRM)" caused in-
stability in the northwestern and southeastern parts of the country."3
These developments could complicate the peace process because these
groups are not parties to the Cotonou Agreement. Despite these obsta-
cles, Liberia swore in a transitional government with David Kpormakpor
as the Chairman."°
Not surprisingly, swearing in a new transitional government did not
bring about lasting peace in Liberia. Apart from the failure to include
the new militia in the peace process, the United Nations, the ECOWAS,
and the three main factions have not properly addressed the issue of
institution and nation-building. The Transitional Government, to a large
extent, was not built on firm democratic foundations and, therefore, not
truly representative of ordinary Liberians. In contrast, when Amos
Sawyer's Interim Government was established, it talked about the role of
participatory institutions in the post-war reconstruction process. Before
installing the Transitional Government, the parties involved did not
delineate concrete measures to strengthen local democracy and re-em-
power traditional political institutions and community leaders. Old units
of the local government should have been reinforced and new ones
instituted. In areas where chieftaincy was strong and well-established
before the outbreak of war, the ECOWAS and the United Nations
should have helped traditional rulers re-establish and re-consolidate their
authority, enabling them to unify forces unaligned to any one fighting
faction. After building and strengthening the local institutions, local
democratic or popular leaders would begin to emerge as political alter-
natives to the leaders of the various armies. These elected representa-
tives could then convene a national conference to properly build a
framework for the future government of Liberia.
101. See id. 6 (noting that the IGNU indicated its agreement to the installation
of the Transitional Government at the same time as the disarmament process).
102. The leadership aims of the Bong Resistance Movement are unknown at this
time.
103. See Second Report, supra note 99, 19 (acknowledging that the fighting
among the new armed groups has resulted in the displacement of nearly 10,000 peo-
ple in certain regions of Liberia).
104. See New Ruling Council Takes Over, W. AFR., Mar. 14-20, 1994, at 463
(identifying Prof. Kpormakpor as the head of the five-man Council of the Liberian
National Transitional Government).
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The Transitional Government, recognizing its lack of a popular power
base when it assumed office, issued a statement to the Secretary-General
on developments in the peace process."°e The statement reaffirmed the
new administration's authority and jurisdiction over the entire country,
but noted the need to restore popular democracy to ensure the success
of the Cotonou Accord. 6 The statement further mentioned that local
democracy was not only necessary for political control over Liberia, but
was also a prerequisite to enable the Transitional Government to prepare
a full budget for the country, deliver relief supplies to all parts of Libe-
ria, finance the electoral process, and enhance the success of the
Cotonou Accord.1" Thus, the failure to develop the peace process from
the bottom up and the subsequent lack of full control of Liberia by the
Transitional Government seriously impaired the Cotonou Accord.
Aside from the warring factions not trusting each other,"° there
were rifts growing within them. Both Charles Taylor and Alhaji Kromah
appeared to begin losing control of their armies."° The rifts were
threatening the peace process. The Transitional Government noted that
the NPFL would not disarm if the Krahns and Mandingos" continued
their internal fighting within the ULIMO and as long as the LPC contin-
ued to bear its arms. The Krahns and Mandingos are two major ethnic
groups within the ULIMO. The Krahns stated that they would continue
to fight the Mandingos until the Chairman of the ULIMO, who is a
105. See Letter Dated 18 May 1994 From the Permanent Representative of Liberia
to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General. U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.
S/19941594 (1994) [hereinafter Government Statement] (submitting the Liberian
Government's assessment of the Liberian situation).
106. Id. at 3 (declaring that arrangements were being made by the Government to
expand its presence in all areas of the country by appointing local government offi-
cials).
107. Id.
108. See "A Lack of Faith," W. AR., Sept. 5-11, 1994, at 1547 (discussing the
problem of the warring factions' refusal to disarm).
109. See Taylor's NPFL in Disarray, W. AFR., Sept. 5-11, 1994, at 1546-47 (re-
porting of attempts by Nixon Gaye, an NPFL commander, to dislodge Taylor from
power).
110. The conflict between these two ethnic groups was an indicator of the import
of ethnicity in the outbreak of the war in 1989. Taylor received most of his support
from the Gio Mano ethnic group while President Doe's regime relied closely on the
Krahns for support. See W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia:
Regional Organization and the Resolution of Internal Conflicts, RALPH BUNCHE INST.
U.N. OCCASIONAL PAP. S. (XVI) (1994) (commenting on ethnicity as a catalyst for
the Liberian war).
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Mandingo, recommends different people to high-level posts in the Tran-
sitional Government. The Chairman of ULIMO, however, has refused to
meet this demand. As a result, serious armed fighting erupted between
the two groups, resulting in the loss of many combatant and innocent
civilian lives. Both groups have vowed not to disarm as long as their ri-
valry continued. There are very few signs that the rivalry will subside
soon despite the efforts of the Council of State, the ECOMOG, and
others."'
VI. THE AKOSOMBO AGREEMENT
The NPFL, ULIMO, and AFL met in Akosombo, Ghana on Septem-
ber 12, 1994, to amend and supplement the provisions of the Cotonou
Accord with a new peace treaty, the Akosombo Agreement."' Through
this Agreement, the parties intended to further the peace process."3
The underlying premise of the Akosombo Agreement indicated that the
ECOWAS was prepared to reduce its role and cede greater responsibility
to the Transitional Government."4 There are several salient provisions
of the Akosombo Agreement. Section B states that the Transitional
Government would participate in supervising and monitoring the peace
process along with the ECOWAS and the UNOMIL."5 This represents
a departure from the provisions of the Cotonou Accord, which placed
the responsibility of overseeing the process only on the ECOWAS and
the UNOMIL."6 Section C involves the Transitional Government in
monitoring the air, land, and sea entry points into Liberia."7
Section D outlaws the LPC and the LDF.' 8 It states that the facili-
tation or creation of new or splinter armed groups would constitute a
violation of the terms of this agreement. The ECOMOG in collaboration
with the Transitional Government and verified by the UNOMIL, would
disarm and disband such groups and prosecute their members under the
laws of Liberia."9 The Akosombo Agreement also modifies the disar-
111. Government Statement, supra note 105, at 5.
112. Akosombo Agreement, Sept. 12, 1994, pmbl.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. pt. 1, § B, art. 3, ct. 1.
116. Cotonou Accord, supra note 77, art. 3.
117. Akosombo Agreement, supra note 112, pt. I, § C, art. 4, ct. 4.
118. Id. pt. I, § D, art. 5, ct. 2(k).
119. Id.
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mament process. The process now includes the Transitional Govern-
ment.
12
The Akosombo Agreement changes the peace-enforcement powers of
the ECOMOG to be in compliance with U.N. Resolutions 788 and 813.
Article 8(1) of the Cotonou Accord specifies that the ECOMOG has the
right to defend itself against a warring faction physically attacking
it.'21 Paragraph (3) of the same article further provides that the
ECOMOG may use its peace-enforcement powers against a party vio-
lating the Cotonou Accord and refusing to abide by the recommenda-
tions of the Violation Committee, which comprises representatives from
the U.N. Observer Mission, the ECOMOG, and the warring factions."
This last provision, however, is inconsistent with Security Council Reso-
lutions 788 and 813. The resolutions insist that the ECOWAS implement
the Cotonou Accord peacefully. Section G of the Akosombo Agreement
rectifies this incongruity by providing that the Transitional Government
and the ECOMOG shall have the power to use force against any party,
new armed group, or splinter group who continues to violate the peace
process." Presumably, this provision implicitly gives primary peace-
keeping responsibility to the government of Liberia. The Transitional
Government, which is the de facto authority in Liberia, would have such
powers. The ECOMOG would then play a secondary role. To further
reinforce the Transitional Government's authority, section H expands the
Government's responsibility to include internal security arrangements
such as police, customs, and immigration.'
The Akosombo Agreement also amends some of the provisions relat-
ing to the executive arm of the Transitional Government. The Cotonou
Accord was silent on how the cabinet of the Transitional Government
would make decisions, which lead to the inference that the five mem-
bers of the Council of State would make decisions by consensus. Taking
into account the division among the parties, the Akosombo Agreement
now provides that the Transitional Government may make decisions by
a simple majority.' Furthermore, the Council of State will now in-
clude an additional member from the Liberian National Conference
120. Id.
121. Id. pt. I, § G, art. 8(1).
122. Cotonou Accord, supra note 77, art. 8, § G.
123. Akosombo Agreement, supra note 112, pt. I. § G, art. 8(1)-(2).
124. 1d pt. I, § H, art. 9, ct. 4.
125. IdM P I. § A(ii).
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recently convened in Monrovia.'26 And to avoid a repeat of the dis-
agreements over nominations by the parties to key executive posi-
tions,'27 the Akosombo Agreement provides that when an executive
post is allocated to one party, the two deputy posts will be allocated to
the other two parties.'28
VII. LEGAL ISSUES IN THE EVALUATION OF THE SUCCESS
OR FAILURE OF THE LIBERIAN PEACE PROCESS
The first question is what kind of legal framework does the Commu-
nity need to prevent or to peacefully resolve future disputes in the sub-
region? This is a very real and important question. Apart from the Libe-
rian conflict, there is a civil war in Sierra Leone and a rebellion by the
Touraegs in Mali. If these conflicts escalate, will the Community be in
position to successfully intervene? Given the ECOWAS's shortcomings
in Liberia, developing a legal framework that prevents arbitrary actions
or measures would enhance future efforts at conflict resolution.
Any future attempt by the Community to resolve conflicts will require
a transparent and democratic mode of decision-making and ac-
countability at the Community level where non-state actors can exchange
views, debate communal concerns, and work out strategies to bring
about peace. Therefore, to peacefully resolve internal conflicts in the
sub-region, this legal framework should institutionalize dialogue through
which citizens of the ECOWAS can mediate with each other and with
their respective governments, and can apply pressure on political organi-
zations."' The ECOWAS should not intervene in a sub-regional con-
flict on an ad hoc or discretionary basis. Rather, participation by non-
state actors should be annexed to the Community's Non-Aggression
Protocol and the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence.' 0
126. Id. pt. II, § A(i).
127. Deadlock in Cotonou, W. AFR., Nov. 15-21, 1993, at 2074-75 (elaborating on
the disagreements among the parties on this issue).
128. Akosombo Agreement, supra note 112, pt. II, § A(iv).
129. The ECOWAS did try to include Liberian interest groups in the peace pro-
cess. Therefore, the SMC had to convene a conference of all political parties and
other interest groups for the purpose of establishing a broad-based interim government.
Decision A/DEC.2/8/90, supra note 24, at 8. Given the NPFL's distrust of the inter-
governmental efforts, future conflict resolution processes should include non-state ac-
tors from the Community.
130. ECOWAS Doc. A/SP3/5/81, 3 Q.J. ECOWAS 9 (1981).
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This will legally bind the member states to seek the views of non-state
actors.
The terminology used in drafting the Cotonou Accord raises another
important issue. Although this peace plan was considered the final solu-
tion to the Liberian conflict, one main reason for its failure, which
necessitated the amendment at Akosombo, was that it failed to clarify
the position and role of the members of the Council of State. The Ac-
cord failed to specify whether the members nominated by the various
parties would represent the interests of the parties, or whether, upon
assuming office, the members would be independent decision-makers and
represent the interests of all Liberians. Although the terms of the
Cotonou Accord were unclear, the actions of the parties demonstrated an
intention to view the members as persons to whom authority had only
been delegated. Accordingly, Bismarck Kuyon, the first person nominat-
ed to the post of Chairman of the Council of State by the IGNU, had
his nomination revoked when he took a position that was inconsistent
with the views of the IGNU on the process of disarmament.131 The
sum effect of this legal ambiguity is that the Accord merely transferred
factional fighting from the battlefield to the cabinet room. The members
were still tied to the various militia. They only represented the parochial
interests of the parties to the conflict. Had the UN and the ECOWAS
insisted on defining the members' roles with more explicit language, the
U.N. and the ECOWAS could have swayed the members' loyalty to
Liberia as a whole instead of to their respective armies. In the future,
careful attention to drafting is required to express the relationship be-
tween the insurgent forces and their representatives.
The Akosombo Agreement tried to address this loyalty problem. Un-
der the Agreement, each party has the right to review the status of its
appointees in the Transitional Government through the Council of State.
Once the appointments are made, the appointees can only be changed
for cause. What "cause" means, however, is for the parties to determine.
Thus, ostensibly, the nominees are still under the control of the respec-
131. The IGNU decided to remove Kuyon because he had compromised its posi-
tion on the issue of disarmament before the seating of the Transitional Government. It
alleged that while Kuyon described himself as neutral, he was siding with the NPFL
and the ULIMO, who believed that the Transitional Government should be seated
before disarmament and encampment took place. See LNTG Leadership Drama, W.
AFR., Nov. 29 - Dec. 5, 1993, at 2162-63 (expounding on why the IGNU is dissatis-
fied with Kuyon); see also Matthews Explains, W. AFR., Dec. 20-26, 1993. at 2308
(stating that Kuyon ceased to represent the IGNU).
1994] 393
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
tive militia. This problem could continue to be an obstacle to the func-
tioning of the Transitional Government.'
Another legal issue was that the Cotonou Accord did not explicitly
address the problematic question of disarmament. Article 6 of the
Cotonou Accord identifies disarmament as the ultimate objective of the
cease-fire. Accordingly, the parties agreed to disarm under the supervi-
sion of the ECOMOG, which the U.N. monitored and verified. The
Accord enumerates a series of measures aimed at achieving disarma-
ment.' The Accord, however, failed to stipulate when disarmament
would actually commence. The parties disagreed on this crucial element.
Their disagreement led the ULIMO and the NPFL to virtually disregard
the Accord. The Akosombo Agreement, on the other hand, states that
the Transitional Government would monitor and verify the disarma-
ment," which implies that disarmament would begin after the parties
form the Transitional Government.
132. Akosombo Agreement, supra note 112, pt. II, § A(vii).
133. Cotonou Accord, supra note 77, art. 6. Article 6 provides as follows:
1. All weapons and warlike materials collected shall be stored by ECOMOG in
armories designed by ECOMOG, monitored and verified by the United Nations
observers.
2. All weapons and warlike materials in the possession of the parties shall be
given to ECOMOG, monitored by the United Nations observers, upon appropri-
ate recording and inventory, and placed in designated armories.
3. Said armories shall be secured by ECOMOG, monitored and verified by
United Nations observers, upon proper documentation or inventory of all
weapons and warlike materials received.
4. Each of the warring factions shall ensure that its combatants report all weap-
ons and warlike materials to ECOMOG, monitored and verified by United Na-
tions observers upon proper inventory. Such weapons and warlike materials,
upon inventory, shall be taken to the designated armories by ECOMOG, under
the monitoring and verification of United Nations observers.
5. All non-combatants who are in possession of weapons and warlike materials
shall also report and surrender the same to ECOMOG, monitored and verified
by the United Nations observers. Such weapons and warlike materials shall be
returned to the owners after due registration, licensing and certification by the
governing authority after the elections.
6. ECOMOG shall have the authority to disarm any combatant or non-combat-
ant in possession of weapons and warlike materials. The United Nations observ-
ers shall monitor all such activities.
7. For the sole purpose of maintaining the cease-fire, ECOMOG shall conduct
any search to recover lost or hidden weapons, observed and monitored by the
United Nations observers.
Id.
134. Akosombo Agreement, supra note 112, pt. 1, § E, art. 6.
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Moreover, all the peace accords concentrated power in the executive
arm of government and did not delineate specific roles for the judiciary
and the legislature. The marginalization of these two arms of govern-
ment weakened the peace process in two primary ways. First, neither the
Yamoussoukro IV Accord, the Cotonou Accord, nor the Akosombo
Agreement state how disputes over the interpretation of their provisions
would be resolved." s The judiciary could have served as an avenue for
arbitration and mediation of disputes arising out of the construction of
the accords. The judiciary remained impartial throughout the conflict and
could have won the confidence of the NPFL. Its involvement would
have fostered a sense of fairness in the peace process, an essential in-
gredient that the NPFL considered lacking.
Second, the legislature played an insignificant role in the peace pro-
cess. The Constitution of the IGNU suspended Chapter V of the Liberi-
an Constitution, which sets forth the powers of the legislature, for the
life of the IGNU and vested legislative power in an Interim Legislative
Assembly (ILA). The ILA could have played a more constructive role in
the peace process by participating directly in negotiations, helping to
monitor the implementation of the various peace agreements, and serving
as a forum for the discussion of alternative ways and means to end the
conflict.
CONCLUSION
Recent events, including the attempted coup d'etat led by Charles
Julu, a member of former President Doe's government," the splinter-
ing of the NPFL, and the emergence of a faction led by Taylor's de-
fense minister" at the time of the signing of the Akosombo Agree-
ment, point to the continuing instability and volatility of the situation in
Liberia. These events raise questions about the ability of the Akosombo
135. The Constitution of the IGNU, however, did provide that Chapter VII of the
Liberian Constitution, captioned "The Judiciary," would continue to be in force.
Therefore, the judiciary could have resolved the disagreement over when disarmament
would begin under the Cotonou Accord. If the Accord had expressly stated that dis-
putes should be referred to the judiciary, its weakening could have been avoided.
Such a provision would have been consistent with the Liberian Constitution, which
provides that the Supreme Court would be the final arbiter of constitutional issues
and have final appellate jurisdiction in all cases. LUBERAN CoNsr. an. 66.
136. The Coup That Went Badly Wrong, W. APR.. Sept. 26 - Oct. 2, 1994. at
1662-64.
137. Turning the Tables, W. AFR., Aug. 1-7. 1994, at 1342-44.
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Agreement to move the peace process forward. Currently, disarming the
LPC, LDF, the Krahn-led faction of the ULIMO, and the breakaway
faction of the NPFL is the most pressing problem. Excluding these new
factions from the talks at Akosombo and, subsequently, outlawing them
may impede the peace process. Relying on peace-enforcement powers as
a means of resolving the conflict may lead to further fighting and un-
dermine the purpose of the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreements. The
Transitional Government should engage the emerging factions in a dia-
logue in order to disarm and encamp their fighters. The main warring
parties could amend the Akosombo Agreement to include these new
factions in reconstructing Liberian civil society by permitting them to
nominate representatives to the Council of State, allotting them positions
in the Transitional Government, and granting them seats in the Legisla-
tive Assembly. If these new factions are not included in the peace pro-
cess and the Transitional Government, Liberia will likely slide back into
the chaos that began in 1989.
